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B R U C E  L IN C O L N ’S ? H IL O S O E H Y
K e v in  S g h il b r a g k
ا - Introduction
The title o f my paper is polemical. Eor this reason I w ant to hegin 
with a brief sketch and justification for w hat I am  aiming to do.
M y view is that historians, anthropologists, and others who develop 
theories about religion always also develop philosophies. In  order to 
study religions, one m ust at least implicitly have answered certain ques- 
tions about w hat one takes to be real and not real, knowable and not 
knowable, and good and not good. In  other words, scholars of religion, 
like all hum an beings, live and act with certain metaphysical, episte- 
mological, and axiological presuppositions. Now, one way of under- 
standing the task of philosophers— a way I endorsé is the Socratic 
task of making one’s metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological pre- 
suppositions explicit, and assessing them. I take this to be Socrates’ typ- 
ical goal in his dialogues. H e seeks to get people who are about their 
]^ p h ilo so p h ic a l business to make explicit and to critique the assump- 
tions and values according to which they do w hat they do. The philoso- 
p h er’s task on this model m ight be called “presuppositional analysis.” 
O n  this view, although not everyone assumes the philosopher’s task of 
explicating presuppositions, everyone has a philosophy.
O f course, there are other views of the relation of philosophy to his- 
tory and other empirical disciplines. Eor example, in the positivist under- 
standing of the sciences (understanding “sciences” in the broad sense 
so that it includes history), the scientist could give a descriptive account 
of a given phenom enon that is not involved in philosophical questions, 
an account of the data that is philosophically neutral. For the positivist, 
one’s observation sentences can be separated from one’s values; one 
can restrict oneself to just the facts. O n  this view, the historian who 
studies religion could then describe the phenom enon of religion with- 
out raising, even implicitly, any metaphysical, epistemological, or axio- 
logical questions. For the positivist, it makes little sense to speak of a 
h istorian’s philosophy. T he two fields of history and philosophy differ 
and their questions have no overlap. O n  this u d e rs ta n d in g , also, it is
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possible to insist that the study of religion should exclude unscien tific  
approaches to the data, that it should be resolutely scientific and leave 
views of the real, the true, and the good to theologians إ.
O n my anti-positivist view, however, the scientific and the philo- 
sophical can be distinguished, bu t they cannot be separated. This is 
because a scholar’s views are always from somewhere, which is to say 
that they are not philosophically neutral. They embody a particular set 
o f norm ative assumptions. O n  this view, which I am  recom m ending, 
scholars study their data from a particular perspective, and this per- 
spective is always already established in part by their answers to meta- 
physical, epistemological, and axiological questions.ج Just as “descriptions 
are theory-laden,” then, I am  proposing that definitions, comparisons, 
and explanations of religions are philosophy-laden.
O n  this im derstanding, it follows that the difference between the 
scientific study of religions and philosophy is not the difference between 
those who do and those who do not hold metaphysical, epistemologi- 
cal, and axiological positions. T he difference is ra ther that between 
those who hold such positions implicitly and n c ritic a lly  and those who 
hold them  explicitly and critically. T he scientific study of religion, like 
any hum an fa c t ic e ,  implies the willingness to make one’s presupposi- 
tions explicit w henever this is necessary and appropriate. Thus, the 
difference can be pu t this way: the philosophers of religion bear what 
m ight be called proxim ate responsibility for ^ e s u ^ o s it io n s  making 
them  explicit is their prim ary t a s k b u t  historians of religion bear this 
responsibility remotely־ it becomes their task only when their presup- 
positions are pu t in question, for example, when an opponent objects 
that they obscure some part o f the data. O ne can also say that, whereas 
philosophers of religion have the responsibility to explicate their pre- 
suppositions s^tem atically, which is to say, not only to identify bu t also 
to defend them, the scientific student of religion has the unsy stem atic  
re s^ m ib ility  merely to identify them. As a consequence, those who 
argue that the study of religion should be resolutely scientific are argu- 
ing, in effect, not that the study of religion should avoid taking posi- 
tions on ]mnscientific questions about the nature of the real, the true, 
and the good, bu t ra ther that the positions that scholars do take should 
rem ain implicit and undefended.
1 This seems to be the view of Wiebe (رووول .
2 There are of course n m ^ ilo s o p h ic a l ^esuppositions implicit in scholarship 
as well; for example, scholars may give an account of their data from a perspec- 
tive informed by ^esuppositions about gender and class. I am not claiming that 
philosophical discourse is free from such ^em ppositions.
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2. Lincoln on “belief ”
Let me now turn  m ore fully to Bruce Lincoln and to w hat I am  alleg- 
ing is his implicit philosophy. In  particular I w ant to focus on what 
can he called Lincoln’s epistemology.^ In fois section of foe paper, I 
focus on his view of foe nature of helief, ahout which he makes pass- 
ing comments that point towards his philosophical sympathies. In  the 
next section, I focus on his view of experience, ahout which he, loudly, 
says nothing.^
In “The Study of Religion in the C urrent Political M om ent,” Lincoln 
cites Talal Asad’s influential critique of Clifford G eertz’s definition of 
religion (Lincoln 2003: 1-3). Lincoln notes that Asad’s critique has two 
parts, first a critique of G eertz’s definition of religion as too focused 
on the category of “helief,” a critique which Lincoln seems to accept, 
and second an argum ent against the very idea of defining religion, an 
argum ent which Lincoln rejects as too radical. Before I turn  to Lincoln’s 
discussion of “behef,” I w ant briefly to note the way that Lincoln han- 
dies Asad’s m ore radical argum ent, because I think that it offers a valu- 
able strategy for how to negotiate such questions, namely, by finding 
a via m edia between two extremes.
O n  the question w hether religion can be defined at all, one can 
imagine two opposed answers. In the first place, there are some who 
argue that our definitions capture the essence of the defined object and, 
on fois view, definitions of religion identify the essence of religion. Asad 
objects, however, that the very idea that religion has some circumscrib- 
able essence is an idea that only em erged at a specific time and place 
in history, namely, after the religions sphere was delimited in Christian 
Europe by the T reaty of W estphalia in 1648 (Asad 3وول : ch. 1). T he 
notion that religion is the kind of thing that can be defined is there- 
fore not self-evident, but rather reflects the particular historical and 
political rircum stances of the m odern secularizing West. Eor a scholar 
to continue fois project o f “defining religion” would be to participate 
in discursive practices that are im plicated in recognizable ways to mod- 
ern Christian apologetics and colonialist politics.
In  his response, Lincoln docs not reject Asad’s dec0 ]^ ru c tio n  or his- 
torization of defining religion, but he docs not accept the conclusion
3 Malting explicit Lineoln’s implieit axiology, ineluding his implicit political phi- 
losophy, would he equally valuahle and would, I suspect, reveal even greater agree- 
ment hetween his views and mine.
4 This section draws inspiration from Godlove 2002.
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that all such definitions are illegitimate. T he fact that any definition 
will he “the historical product o f discursive processes,” Lincoln says, 
“hardly renders futile all efforts at definition, however, ^ rtic u la rly  when 
one understands these as provisional attempts to clarify one’s thought, 
not to capture the innate essence of things” (2). Lincoln thus detaches 
the conceptual link hetween definitions and essences, and proposes his 
own, nonessentialist definition, h e m a t ic a l ly ,  then, one can fram e 
L incoln’s position as a kind of golden m ean or via media. O n  one 
side, there are those who use definitions of religion and who see them  
as identifying an essence. O n  the other side, there those like Asad who 
reject definitions of religion hecause they discount the possibility of an 
ahistorical essence. Lincoln partially agrees with h o ff sides; that is, he 
agrees with h o ff  the m odern project o f defining religion and with the 
postm odern suspicion towards essences. Similarly, one m ight say that 
Lincoln partially disagrees with both sides, that is, with both m odem ist 
essentialism and postm odem  rejection of definitions. W here the defining 
essentialist has two yesses and the n i-d e fin itio n a l anti-essentialist has 
two no ’s, Lincoln has a yes and a no. This is why I called his approach 
a via media, and I consider it a good strategy when considering a 
debate between two sides, both of which house an im portant insight 
(cf. H artshorne 1987).
O n  Asad’s second argum ent, however, the one in which he argues 
that G eertz’s definition of religion is too focused on belief, Lincoln 
seems largely persuaded. أل  is a shame because G eertz’s definition of 
religion never mentions belief at all; “belief” is not an especially impor- 
tan t term  in G eertz’s vocabulary. Nevertheless, Lincoln concurs with 
Asad “that Geertz m ade interiority the locus of the religious” (1). H e 
suggests that this is indicated by the nouns Geertz docs use in his 
definition: symbols, moods, m otivations, and conceptions. W hat ١٧  ̂
want, Lincoln says, is an understanding of religion that docs not slight 
those religions “that are oriented less tow ard ‘belief’ and the status of 
the individual believer” (1). In place of G eertz’s definition, therefore, 
Lincoln recom m ends an understanding of religion that docs not cover 
up its social and political dimension. Lincoln offers a definition of reli- 
gion as consisting of four domains: discourse, fa c t ic e ,  community, and 
institution.5
5 Lincoln defines religion as consisting of these four parts: “ 1. A discourse whose 
concerns transcend the human, temporal, and contingent, and that claims for itself 
a similarly transcendent status. . . . 2. A set of practices whose goal is to produce
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Recall that my interest is in arguing that Lincoln is, at least implic- 
itly, involved in epistemological questions. O ne sees such involvement 
especially, I w ould like to argue, in the first dom ain  o f L incoln’s 
definition, where he replaces the traditionally central category of reli- 
gious helief with religions discourse. His reason for this switch is w orth 
quoting in full:
M y preference for “disconrse” over “belief” is based on two argum ents. 
First is an  e ^ te m o lo g ic a l o n s id e ra tio n . S tudents o f religion have no 
unm ediated  access to the beliefs o f those they study, nor to any other 
aspects o f their interiority. R ather, we come to know som ething of those 
beliefs only as they find external (always im perfect and sometimes quite 
distorted) expression in acts o f discourse and  f a c t ic e .  R g a rd in g  tha t of 
w hich one can have no direct knowledge, scholars cannot speak with any 
confidence and should in their professional capacity, a t f e ^  perforce 
rem ain silent. Second, an ontological and ontogenetic observation: Belief 
alm ost never arises de novo in pristine interior reflection and  experience, 
b u t generally follows exposure to the discourse o f significant others. These 
include parents, above all, bu t also friends, family and clergy, w ho signal 
w hat they believe and w hat they (also the im titutions and traditions to 
w hich they belong) believe ought he believed. As these statem ents are 
received and m etabolized by those to w hom  they are addressed, they are 
internalized as beliefs, bu t in this process, discourse is both  logically and 
chronologically prior to belief (111, n. 15).
In  sbort, helief is private and tberefore inaccessihle, and so tbe student 
of religion will do hetter to attend to religions discourse, wbicb is puhlic.
Lincoln’s re^ m m en d a tio n  tbat students of religion replace “helief” 
witb “discourse” can be best understood, I tbink, if we place it in rela- 
tion to a larger debate about tbc place of “belief” in tbc study of reli- 
gions. As I did with bis discussion of defining religion, I w ant to place 
it in the context of two positions tbat identify w bat I take to be tbc 
poles of tbc debate. O n  tbc one side, tbere are tbosc wbo argue tbat 
tbc category of helief bas a privileged or even essential role in the study 
of culture A ج. nd one can give a good reason for this position: one can
a proper world an d /o r proper hum an suhjeets, as defined hy a religious diseourse 
to whieh these praetiees are eonneeted. . . . 3. A eommunity whose memhers con- 
struet their identity with referenee to a religious diseourse and its attendant prae- 
tiees. . . . 4. An institution that regulates religious diseourse, praetiees, and eommunily, 
reprodueing them over time and modifying them as neeessary, while asserting their 
eternal validity and transeendent value” (5-/).
6 To take two elassie examples among many, Edward Burnett Tylor defines reli- 
gion as the “helief in spiritual beings,” and William Jam es defines it as “the belief 
that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously 
adjusting ourselves thereto.”
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argue that it is precisely the agent’s helief that makes an activity the 
activity it is. An activity is a religious activity, for example, only if it is 
inform ed hy a religious helief. For this reason, it is crucial that the stu- 
dent of culture understand the heliefs o f those she studies. A second 
step typically follows: if heliefs are interior m ental states, then the stu- 
dent of culture also needs some means to ‘،get inside the heads,” so 
to speak, of the people she studies, for example, through participant 
obseiYation, honest informants, or careful intuition.
The opposite position excludes belief. Those in this position argue 
that the category of belief is not crucial to religion. I take it that fois 
is the position of D onald Lopez, J r ., who ohjects to “the idea that a 
religion m ust have heliefs in order to be a religion” (Lopez 1998: 29). 
Lopez argues that a trihu tions of belief, a “nehulous” and “elusive inte- 
rior state” (27, 21), serve as a “suhstitute,” “mask,” or “surrogate” (21, 
21, 27) for economic interests. Lopez gives the example of the m artyr- 
dom  of Feter o f Verona. Though Feter is eulogized for being !tilled 
for his heliefs, Lopez proposes that religious beliefs played no role: 
“Feter was m urdered not for his heliefs but for his deeds, specifically 
for the confiscation of the property of two C athar noblem en” (2b). 
Thus, as analytic philosophers m ight pu t it, helief is a propositional 
attitude, but property is not a proposition, and ^n fisca tin g  it is not 
an attitude. In  an argum ent like Asad’s, then, Lopez argues that the 
assumption that religious actions and institutions m ust have heliefs in 
order to he religious is “neither natural nor universal. It m ight he 
descrihed as an ideology, not so m uch in the sense of false conscious- 
ness but as an idea that arises from a specific set of m aterial interests” 
(28). According to Lopez, fois ideology of helief reflects the particular 
interests of European Christianity. T o assume that religions outside that 
sphere of influence involve beliefs is to introduce belief “into domains 
where it was أس  previously present” (29), and Lopez points to Buddhism 
in nineteenth-century Sri Lanka as an example of a religion that allegedly 
operated w ithout heliefs. Thus Lopez is not arguing that there are some 
religions in which statements o f faith are !css central or that religious 
heliefs support m aterial interests; those claims are u ^ o ^ ro v e rs ia l. Dis 
claim is ra ther that the study of religion (at least, perhaps, outside the 
study of m odern Christianity) docs not need to include the category of 
“belief” at all.
^ e r e  docs Lincoln stand in relation to these two poles in the dehate? 
O ne m ight think that he stands with Lopez in the second position. 
After all, Lincoln docs w ant us to drop the category of “belief,” and 
the reason he gives is that helief is private, interior, and so inaccessible
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to the historian, whereas discourse is puhlic. But the complete rejec- 
tion of helief is not Lincoln’s view, and I will argue that it is not a 
view anyone should take.
The prohlem  is that the two polar positions on helief (like the two 
positions on definition) are contrary and so while hoth cannot he right, 
both can be wrong. T here is a third, middle position, as yet unap- 
preciated. This is easy to see, I think, if we give the first position the 
overly simple label of the “p rivate /belief” position and we call the sec- 
ond position the “^ b l i c /^ t i - b e l i e f ” position. W hat is wrong with both 
positions is that they assume that belief is something private. They both 
assume that a belief is an interior m ental state, and therefore, to know 
w hat another helieves it is necessary to get inside that person’s head. 
Clearly, a via m edia is possible if it makes sense to speak of such a 
thing as “public belief.” And, as a m atter of fact, arguing that beliefs 
are public has been a central them e of tw entieth-century philosophy. 
أل  is actually a point of agreem ent between analytic philosophers and 
Continental philosophers. Thus we have W ittgenstein arguing that there 
can be no private language because m eaning is necessarily social, and 
Sartre arguing that Cartesian subjectivity must be reconceived as inter- 
su^ectivity. “M eanings just a in’t in the head” is a slogan uniting prag- 
matists, cognitive scientists, feminist epistemologists, and others.^ W ith 
this em ergent understanding of belief as nonrepresentational, embod- 
ied, intersubjective, and public, the study of belief cannot be called the 
study of “interiority.”8
H ere is a quiz question that may better illuminate this idea of pub- 
lie belief. W ho is the scholar who m ade it his task to bring this idea 
of public belief to the study of religion? H e is the scholar who wrote 
the following: ،،The generalized attack on privacy theories of m eaning 
is, since early Husserl and the later W ittgenstein, so m uch a part of 
m odern thought that it need not be developed once m ore here. W hat 
is necessary is to see to it that the news of it reaches anthropology.” 
T he answer is: Clifford Geertz (1973: 12). Lincoln and Asad are cor- 
rect that Geertz insists that meaningful actions necessarily involve beliefs: 
“You can ’t wink . . . w ithout knowing w hat counts as M nking” (12). 
Nevertheless, Geertz condemns the idea that beliefs are interior men- 
tal phenom ena, calling this the cognitivist fallacy (12). Instead, Geertz
7 The quote is Hilary ?u tnam ’s (1975: 227).
8 In my judgment, three milestones tracing the development of a nonrepresen- 
tational theory of knowledge are Rorty 1979, Bernstein 1988, and Frisina 2002.
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s^^s that w hat the m emhers of a eulture hellere Is ،،as puhlic as m ar- 
riage and as observable as agriculture” (91). I agree with G eertz’s crit- 
ics that he tends to insulate religions meanings from social and political 
networks of power, and so I appreciate Asad’s Focauldian idea of reli- 
gion as discipline, and I adm ire and use L incoln’s m ore politically 
inform ed definition of religion. Nevertheless, G eertz’s critics distort his 
project if they think that Geertz treats beliefs as private states of m ind.؟
Now, if this third option of public belief (inadequately sketched as 
it is) seems like a legitimate possibility, then it also seems to me that 
it is the position to which Lincoln is closest. I say this because Lincoln 
docs not argue that those who study religion abandon belief, but merely 
th a t they replace it w ith the m ore publicly accessible “discourse.” 
“Discourse” may or may أس  be believed by those who use it, but it is 
necessarily propositional. أل  cannot be equated with m aterial interests. 
M oreover, Lincoln treats discourse as the privileged category: Lincoln 
is clear that an activity is a religious activity only if it is inform ed by 
religions discourse H ص. ere the parallel to Geertz is striking. For exam- 
pie, Geertz argues that w hat distinguishes the religions perspective from 
the aesthetic perspective is the symbols of the really real that induce 
religions moods and motivations (Geertz 1973: 111-9). Lincoln com- 
plains that in this privileging of the interior life, Geertz assumes a 
Frotestant religiosity (1). But then Lincoln seems to make the same 
move, arguing that آن ن s religious discourse that makes growing a beard 
a religious practice. “Lacking . . . [a] motive of this sort,” Lincoln says 
a beard  “represents a strictly aesthetic preference” (6). 1 see no epis- 
temological difference between G eertz’s appeal to “motivations” and 
Lineoln’s appeal to “m otive.” N either is, in my judgm ent, an appeal to 
private, inaccessible interiority, nor نs either especially Frotestant. Instead, 
Lincoln, like Geertz, نs arguing that religious practices must have an 
at least implicit element of publicly available discursive or propositional 
thought in order to be identifiable as religious. In  my judgm ent, this 
.s the position, philosophically speaking, that they should takeن
1 am  arguing, in other words, that, although the place of belief in 
different traditions نs not the same, all religions involve belief. In Christian
.(I develop this point in Schilhrack (forthcoming و
10 Thus Lincoln defines religious practices as: “A set of practices whose goal is 
to produce a proper world an d /o r proper human suhjects, as defined hy a reli- 
gious discourse to which these practices are connected” (6). The primacy given to 
discourse is also seen in that Lincoln has spoken of religion as simply discourse 
(Lincoln 225 :6 وول  [Thesis #2]).
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theology, helled is traditionally taken as a cognitive dimension of faith 
(tides) and it is allied with trust (fiducia) as its emotional/affective dimen- 
sion and with loyalty (fidelitas) as its m otivational/conative dimension. 
From  this (admittedly parochial) ^ rsp ec tiv e , to say that ]mn-Christian 
religious lack “helief” would he to say that the practices of religious 
outside the Christian influence are ]mncognitive. أل  is hard  to see that 
such a working assumption is less et]mocentric than its opposite. Similarly, 
to assume that hekef refers to an inward state is to take what Christians—  
or rather, some Christians, and especially Luther— have m eant hy the 
term  and turn  this into a general definition ال.  W hat is needed, instead, 
is to trace in each particular case the presence or ahsence of such cat- 
egories in the ^ac titio n e rs  themselves.
To he clear, then, Lincoln and 1 agree that religion is to be stud- 
ied as a social fact, not as a ^ychological entity located in individual 
minds, and we also agree that a believer’s discourse m ay not corre- 
spond to w hat she privately affirms. أل  may therefore seem that the 
disagreem ent between us is merely verhal: w hat he distinguishes as dis- 
course and helief, 1 am  calling public helief and private affirmation. 
Nevertheless, the difference is mom than verbal hecause Lincoln’s vocah- 
ulary (which separates religion into external “expressions” of which out- 
siders can have “direct knowledge” and “in terior” beliefs to which 
outsiders have “no unm ediated access”) is dualistic. T o define belief as 
private rather than as a puhlic leads to a Cartesian anxiety in which 
it makes sense to point out, for example, that Christians say that Jesus 
is divine, hu t the student of religion cannot know that any Christian 
has ever believed this. T he view that heliefs are perm anently inaccessi- 
hlc huilds epistemological douht into one’s theory. Here, like the con- 
touts of a hox that can never be opened, ،،helief” hecomes a transcendent 
or noum enal term  and plays no role in understanding or explaining 
religion. Lopez’s view that ،،helief” can be elim inated is the conclusion 
of such reasoning. O n  my view, hy contrast, the statem ent ،،The pil- 
grims washed themselves at the shrine because they believed that doing 
so m ight heal them ” is perfectly legitimate. As long as ،،helief” means 
puhlic belief, to replace that form ulation with “According to their dis- 
course, washing themselves at the shrine might heal them ” is not merely 
pedantic or superfluous. آل  burdens the study of religion with a mind-
11 For an astute history of the term in Christian thought and practice, and an 
argument that religions other than Christianity lack belief as a comparable orga- 
nizing concept, see Ruel 1 8 2 و .
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body dualism that is doubly ^ob lem atic : it is rarely shared by the reli- 
gious studied and  it has been widely discredited in ^ ^ e m p o r a r y  
philosophy.
?). Lincoln on “experience”
W e have seen that Lincoln gives reasons for why he did not w ant to 
include the category of belief in his definition of religion. A bout the 
category of “experience,” however, he has little to say. أل  is not only 
not part of his definition of religion; “e ^ e r ie n c e ” docs not show up 
in the index of any of his books. O f course, fois is deliberate, and fois 
silence places Lincoln’s work on one side of a contem porary debate 
about the nature of religion and how best to study it. O n  the ques- 
tion of experience, therefore, Lincoln docs not take a middle path; he 
represents one of the two poles. For fois reason, as one m ight guess, 
I will argue that his approach leaves something to be desired. ٧
W hat are the two contrary positions on the place of “experience” 
in the study of religion? In the first place, there are those who define 
religion precisely in terms of experience. For fois camp, the heart of 
religion is not a m atter of assenting to a certain creed, nor perform ing 
certain ethical or ritual actions. R ather, the heart of religion is having 
a certain kind of experience. T he key figure in the emergence of fois 
position is Friedrich S h le ie ^ a c h e r ,  who sought, in the wake of K an t’s 
critiques, to distinguish “true religion” from the beleaguered domains 
o f belief and practice, which Schleierm acher argued are merely frs 
expressions. I do not believe that fois is the dom inant position in the 
study of religion, but it has clearly been an influential one, and there 
is a direct line of influence from h le ie r m a c h e r  to the anti-reductionist 
program s of R udolf O tto  and to M ircea Eliade. Call fois foc experi- 
entialist position.
In the second camp are those who define religion with no reference 
at all to religious experience. From fois perspective, religion is a language 
game, a discourse, or a system of representations, and experience is 
otiose. I am  putting Lincoln in fois camp. Those who take fois second 
position often do their theorizing in reaction to the first cam p and the 
way in which Christian apologetic concerns have worked their way into 
the study of religion. In  our day, the pendulum  is swinging or has
12 This section draws inspiration from Csordas ووول .
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already swung away from the study of religion as the study of modes 
of experience or the feeling of the sacred, to the study of religion as 
discourse or text. Call this the semiotic approach .13
In this context, I w ant to ask w hether the semiotic approach has 
swung the pendulum  too far, w hether or not there is a position that 
hetter synthesizes its insights with those of the experientialist position. 
Towards this goal, I w ant to point to w hat I take to he two short- 
comings of an exclusively semiotic ^ p ro a c h , one descriptive and the 
other m ore theoretical.
The descriptive prohlem  is that the semiotic approach ignores a cen- 
tral dim ension of religion as it is lived. Consider an example from 
Dennis C o ^ n g to ]^  journalistic account of the practices of a snake-han- 
dling church in Alahama (Covington 1995). W ith eloquence and S ection , 
Covington explores the practices of this A ppalachian church, giving 
special attention to the ecstasies of holding the rattlesnakes and of speak- 
ing in tongues. In  the course of his account, he descrihes a m an whose 
wife had  gotten the Holy Ghost at a service and who w anted to get 
it, finally, for himself. This desire is completely understood hy the oth- 
ers in the congregation. So, a half dozen m en pray over him  and lay 
hands on him, and the m an is “up and running from one end of the 
sanctuary to the other, now twirling, now swooning, now collapsing 
once again on the floor, his eyes like the eyes of a horse that smells 
smoke, the unknown tongue spewing from his m outh” (167). All o f this, 
I helieve, Lincoln could include under the category of practice. After 
the service, however, as the m an hrushes sandwich crumhs from his 
lap, he says to Covington that ‘،it was a good service all right, bu t it 
sure would have been better if he’d only gotten the Holy G host” (166). 
So, in the eyes of this m an, and also in the eyes of the congregation 
at large, something was missing, and this was something precious. T he 
m an was fully religious according to Lincoln’s definition; he was par- 
ticipating in the discourse of his religion, in its fa c tic e s , community, 
and institutions. But w hat m atters to him  is how it feels to be reli­
13 In terms of these two approaches, one can see that again, ironieally, Lincoln 
is close to Geertz. For following Faul RIeoeur’s argument that one can treat actions 
like texts (Ricoeur 1 وول ), Geertz treats religious rituals as puhlic documents that 
can he read for their meaning (for G eertz’s aknow ledgem ent of Ricoeur, see 
ول73:ول ). Says Geertz: “The concept of culture I espouse . . . is essentially a semi- 
otic one. . . . Doing ethnography is like trying to read . . . a  manuscript” (5 :73 ول , 
10). In a critique that parallels my critique of Lincoln, Tyson ( 1 8 8 و ) and Stoller 
( 7 وول ) complain that Geertz’s semiotic approach ignores the sensual aspects of reli- 
gion as lived.
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gious, w hat some scholars m ight call the form ation o f his religious 
affects and s^ jec tiv ity , his religious mode of heing in the world; what 
is missing, in short, is a p h e^m en o lo g ica l dimension. This is w hat is 
not included in a purely semiotic approach. T he descriptive prohlem  
of the semiotic approach, in other words, is that experience has fallen 
out of the theorizing, and so fois approach treats religion in terms of 
w hat are, from a ^ e ^ m e n o lo g ic a l  ^ rsp ec tiv e , ohjectified fostractions. 
Thus with Lincoln one studies not the piety of the M oham ed Atta, hut 
foc docum ent he Ich in his ca r.14
Predictahly, I think that the theoretical problem  with the semiotic 
approach concerns its implicit philosophy. O f course, from my per- 
spective, bofo foc experiential approach and the semiotic approach 
involve philosophical decisions. I w ant to focus in a r t ic u la r  on the 
decisions they em body concerning the relation of language to experi- 
ence, of word to world. Some argue that ^]ffe ierm acher holds that 
religions experience is ahle to circum vent the categories of language in 
order to have im m ediate ^ n n e c tio n  with its object. W hether or not 
h le ie r m a c h e r  himself is guilty of fois, such a position would be deeply 
problem atic for, as W ayne Proudfoot argues, “ [i]f foe feeling is inten- 
tional [that is, if it is the feeling of an object], it cannot be specified 
apart from reference to its object and thus it cannot be independent 
of thought” (Proudfoot 1985: 11). The problem  here is the need to 
identify an experience unm ediated by concepts.
The semiotic approach also seeks to come to terms with the rela- 
tion of word to world, and it also stumbles. T he problem , in brief, is 
that fois approach inherits the question of the relation of language to 
experience, but its solution is not to reconcile or bridge the two realms 
but simply to drop experience out. From  fois semiotic ^ rsp ec tiv e , cor- 
respondence theories of tru th  are unintelligible and all forms of real- 
ism are nai've. T he only data available to the scholar of religion are 
linguistic: texts, systems o^epresen ta tion , discourse, “m arked categories” 
(Lincoln 2000). H ere, pieces of language connect only to other pieces 
of language and the referential question-lingu istic  representation of 
what?— cannot be meaningfully asked. As the prim ary spokesperson for 
fois philosophical m ovem ent says, ،،There is no outside-the-text.”
14 At this point, one ean see that Lincoln’s account of belief as something private 
that does not play a role in understanding or explaining religion implies and is 
implied by his “semiotic” approach that fails to include allegedly private religious 
experiences.
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W hat m ight be a middle position here? From  my perspective as a 
philosopher, the best position for the study of religion will be one that 
is able to negotiate the relation of religions language to religions expe- 
rience in a satisfactory way; it will be one that is least entangled in 
epistemological puzzles. For my money, this will be a position that 
treats religions experience as neither diam ond nor paste. T h a t is, reli- 
gious experience should not be lifted up as the inexpressible essence of 
religion, unsullied by language and history, nor should it be discarded 
as merely the internal echo of social discourse, merely a reflection of 
ideology. In  other words, the balanced position will be one that is both 
^ e n m e n o lo g ic a l  and semiotic. It will be a position that says “yes” 
both to the inclusion of experience as a dimension of religion and to 
the recognition that experience is always shaped in part by language. 
Fut negatively, it will say “no” both to the idea that one m ight iden- 
tify an experience as religions w ithout using hum an concepts, and to 
the idea that experience is fully constituted by language.
Students of religion should not let the claims that religions experi- 
ence is sui generis or autonom ous from belief, and allow fois practice 
to goad them  to over-react and underem phasize the place of experience 
in the history of religious. If  religions traditions label certain bodily and 
m ental states religions, then such experiences should أس  be excluded 
from the study of religion, let alone defined out of existence. T he fact 
that a certain discourse must be in place and employed in order for 
someone to experience a religions experience docs not m ean that the 
analysis of discourse exhausts the study of religion, any m ore than the 
analysis of foci would exhaust the study of fire. M oreover, to distin- 
guish between declaration of o n v ic tio n  and actual o n v ic tio n , between 
the profession of a faith and the tm m form ation of a heart, and in gen- 
eral between exoteric and esoteric aspects of a religion is not limited 
to m odern examples. N or is ft limited to Christianity: thus the dis- 
tinction in Islam between the visible surrender (islam) and the faith 
iiman) o f the believer {mu’min). T o operate with both the category of 
discourse and that of experience reflects a distinction that will be rec- 
ognized by all religious that have a concept o f sincerity.
W hat docs fois m ean for Lincoln’s definition of religion? I don’t 
think that “e ^ e fo n e e ” needs to be added to Lincoln’s four-part definition 
of religion. T o call the m an in C ovington’s book religions would not 
misidentify him. His discourse, practice, and com m unity are all plainly 
religious. In  fact, even his lack of religious experience is religious. So 
as a tool that docs not identify the essence of religion bu t helps us 
to clarify our thinking about the world in which ١٧^ live, Lincoln’s
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definition is helpful— and m ore helpful than m any others. L incoln’s 
definition works as is. Nevertheless, on the larger question w hether reli- 
gious experience is a legitimate ohject of study, I hold that it is. T here 
is an im portant relationship hetween religion as a puhlic fact (that is, 
L incoln’s definition) and the creative agency of the em hodied hum an 
suhject, and this relationship calls for a phenom enological element in 
religious studies.ى
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